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Will Georgia, Alabama and Florida ever agree?
By Associate Professor Peter A. Appel
The Chattahoochee River runs through the city of Atlanta, one of the 
South’s largest cities, which has a high demand for water.
10345Inside.indd   10 6/22/07   2:21:08 PM
Spring/Summer 2007 11 Advocate
The states of Georgia, Alabama and Florida have fought over the last few decades about important 
subjects — SEC championships and economic development are just two such fights. However,  
disputes over water have, in recent years, made up the most important of these controversies. 
or over a 
decade, these 
three states have 
battled over the 
resources of 
the Alabama-
C o o s a -
Tallapoosa (ACT) and 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) 
river basins. Despite adopting congressio-
nally-approved interstate compacts – which 
were essentially agreements to agree – the 
three states have never reached final accords 
over these water bodies.
Many commentators believe this dispute 
will inevitably wind up before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
What they overlook, however, is how this 
controversy began, the different forums in 
which it has been fought and the various 
ways it could be resolved in the interest of all 
of the parties.
The basis of the controversy among these 
three southeastern states lies in the different 
interests each of the states has in the uses 
of water in the ACT and ACF basins, the 
mechanical structure of each of the basins 
and the fact that each of the states oper-
ates by some version of the riparian rights 
doctrine. 
This article will provide an overview of 
how the dispute originally arose, the different 
means of resolving it and what some of the 
potential outcomes of it might be depending 
on the means chosen for resolution. 
The common misconception that, in the 
end, the U.S. Supreme Court must resolve 
this water war ignores the strong evidence 
that suggests that other means and probably 
other branches of the federal government 
will end the dispute.
Mechanical and legal structure of 
the basins
The ACT and ACF river basins both drain 
into the Gulf of Mexico, the ACT at Mobile 
and the ACF into Apalachicola Bay off the 
Florida panhandle. 
Both river basins have a great deal of fed-
eral involvement in the management of the 
flow of the rivers.
The most obvious involvement of the fed-
eral government is through the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. 
The corps has historically managed navi-
gation on internal waterways in the United 
States, and the corps’ civil works projects 
have historically included removing obstacles 
from navigable waters, dredging rivers and 
harbors to promote navigation, building and 
maintaining levees, and building and man-
aging dams for the purposes of promoting 
navigation, creating hydroelectric power and 
controlling floods. 
In addition, in 1958, Congress authorized 
all corps projects to supply municipal drink-
ing water consistent with their other autho-
rized purposes. 
Both the ACT and ACF basins have a 
number of dams owned and operated by 
the corps. 
The most prominent of these in the ACT 
basin is the Allatoona Dam, which forms 
Lake Allatoona; in the ACF, Buford Dam 
forms Lake Lanier.
Although there are certainly more dams 
along each of the basins, lakes Lanier and 
Allatoona form significant sources of munic-
ipal water supply for the Atlanta metropoli-
tan area. 
As the region’s most populated area, the 
Atlanta area has a high demand for water. 
The situation is further complicated 
because Atlanta is the largest metropolitan 
area that relies on the smallest water resourc-
es in the country. 
Lakes Lanier and Allatoona are also popu-
lar recreation areas for people in the Atlanta 
region, which means that Atlantans often 
want water in Lake Lanier on the weekend 
for recreation and water from Lake Lanier for 
their households during the week. 
The management of these two dams, 
which are both toward the beginning of their 
respective watersheds, are thus important in 
fueling some of the dynamics in the tension 
over water: Georgia against the other two 
states; municipal uses of water against other 
consumptive uses, particularly agricultural 
irrigation; nonconsumptive uses such as rec-
reation and navigation; and maintaining 
habitat and water for fish and wildlife.
Although neither lake completely controls 
its watershed, these operations have emerged 
as flashpoints in the disputes among the 
three states and affected stakeholders.
Further downstream, other dams the corps 
operates form significant reservoirs and lakes. 
In the ACT, these lakes include Carters 
Lake, Logan Martin Lake, Weiss Lake and 
Woodruff Lake. In the ACF, significant 
lakes operated by the corps include West 
Point Lake, Lake Seminole and the Walter F. 
George Reservoir.
In addition to the corps, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has author-
ity over all of the non-federally owned and 
operated dams in the ACT and ACF basins. 
Many of the dams are operated by Georgia 
Power; some are municipally or otherwise 
owned.
The Federal Power Act grants FERC the 
authority to issue licenses for these non-
federal entities and licenses typically last for 
50 years. 
Many of the dams in both the ACT and 
the ACF were built during the 1950s, so the 
renewal of these licenses is about to become 
an ongoing project. 
The Federal Power Act dictates that FERC 
consider a number of factors before issuing a 
license or relicensing a project. 
In recent years, FERC has imposed a 
number of restrictions on dams around the 
country for environmental reasons, such as 
fishways and minimum flow requirements. 
Some of these requirements have proven 
too costly for the dam operators, and FERC 
has required the dams to be removed. 
Although none of these situations have 
occurred in Georgia yet, the relicensing pro-
cedures could conceivably cause some dams 
to be removed in this state. 
In addition, FERC licenses are subject 
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to section 401 of the federal Clean Water 
Act. Section 401 requires that a licensee 
receive certification from the affected state 
for any discharge that occurs from a feder-
ally-approved or licensed project. 
Without such certification, the federal 
agency may not issue the required federal 
license. The Supreme Court has affirmed 
that states have wide latitude to place condi-
tions on such certifications or to deny them 
altogether.1
In addition to these specific provisions 
of law that affect the federal agencies with 
responsibility in the ACT and ACF basins, 
more general provisions of environmental 
law affect their decisions. 
The two most important are the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
NEPA requires federal agencies to study 
the environmental impacts of their actions 
before undertaking them. 
ESA requires federal agencies to consult 
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (also 
known as NOAA Fisheries) before under-
taking any project that will jeopardize the 
continued existence of an endangered or 
threatened species or destroy or adversely 
modify the critical habitat of such a spe-
cies. In one famous case, the completion of 
Tellico Dam in Tennessee was halted because 
of the Endangered Species Act. 
These acts apply to all federal activities 
and any actions licensed or authorized by the 
federal government. 
Indeed, as will be seen, it was a lawsuit 
brought to enforce the provisions of NEPA 
that initially triggered the water war among 
Georgia, Alabama and Florida.
How interstate water resources 
are allocated
The U.S. Constitution recognizes three 
means to allocate interstate water bodies. 
The most prominent of these is a suit 
before the U.S. Supreme Court for the equi-
table allocation of a water resource. 
When one state believes that another has 
wrongfully taken too much water from a 
source, the adversely affected state may peti-
tion the Supreme Court to decide the matter. 
To merit review by the high court, the affect-
ed state must show that its interests have been 
affected by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Supreme Court has decided several 
water disputes between and among states. 
Typically, when the court agrees to hear such 
a dispute, it will appoint a special master to 
receive the facts of the case, ask the special 
master to issue a report and recommenda-
tion, and then hear objections from the par-
ties to that report and recommendation.
Unfortunately for the parties involved, the 
law that governs these disputes is a muddle. 
The Supreme Court has held that “equi-
table apportionment” means only that the 
court’s apportionment “is based on broad 
and flexible equitable concerns rather than 
on precise legal entitlements.”2 
The burden of proof rests on the peti-
tioner, and that state will prevail only if it 
can show harm by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The court has announced the rule of equi-
table apportionment is one of federal com-
mon law, and it relies on state, federal and 
international law as sources for the common 
law rule it is developing.
In addition, most lawsuits for equitable 
apportionment have arisen in the West, 
where the rule of prior appropriation of 
water controls. 
Although the court has eschewed reliance 
on that doctrine rigidly to determine inter-
state water disputes, it has recognized that 
the doctrine will give it guidance. 
In the East, where the rule of ripar-
ian rights reigns, no such clear rule governs 
because of the nature of riparian rights as 
being correlative and not fixed. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has really 
decided only two interstate water alloca-
tion disputes from the East: Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts and New Jersey v. New York. 
Both cases were decided within a short 
time of each other in 1931, and neither gives 
firm guidance about what principles the 
Supreme Court would apply to divide water 
bodies between two states that adhere to the 
riparian rights system. 
In the first, the court simply held that 
there was enough water in the disputed 
resources to satisfy each state’s demands. In 
the second, the court announced a division 
of the water but did not give exact reasons 
for its division. 
Thus, even though the lawyers for each 
of the three states in the ACT/ACF disputes 
wanted to negotiate a settlement in light of 
potential Supreme Court litigation, the rules 
affecting those negotiations did not yield 
many principles to help them.
The second means of allocating water 
among states is a congressionally approved 
interstate compact. 
Interstate compacts are essentially treaties 
between and among states, and Congress has 
approved many of them to deal specifically 
with water issues. 
The three southeastern states actually 
entered into two such compacts but, as 
will be explained, ultimately the agreements 
failed. 
Nevertheless, if all affected states can reach 
such a compact, it can clarify the issues of 
resource allocation. 
Indeed, in several instances, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that the interstate com-
pact is the means it prefers for interstate 
water allocation over litigation, as interstate 
compacts allow the parties flexibility and 
direction that litigation in court cannot.
The third means of allocation of water 
between and among states is by congres-
sional act.
For example, the Supreme Court held 
in one of the phases of the Arizona v. 
California litigation – litigation that divided 
the resources of the Colorado River – that an 
act of Congress can amount to an allocation 
of water, even though the record of congres-
sional intent was not entirely clear. 
Congress has, for many reasons, shown 
reluctance to enter into this area deliberately 
without the approval of the affected states 
(through an interstate compact). 
The reasons vary, but since the mid-1800s, 
Congress has expressed a policy of deferring 
to state water law on the allocation of this 
resource. 
In addition, congressional allocation 
brings with it the attendant risks that always 
come with a legislative solution to a prob-
lem – the horse-trading and log-rolling that 
can occur during the drafting and amend-
Background image: Panoramic view of Apalachicola Bay, Fla.
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ing of legislation.
The fact that 
Florida alone has 
more members in 
the U.S. House of 
Representatives than 
Alabama and Georgia 
together (25 vs. 20), 
combined with the 
political parties of 
those representatives 
and senators, only 
complicates matters.
The recent turn-
over in the politi-
cal leadership in 
Congress, the poten-
tial for disputes with-
in a single state’s del-
egation and the lack 
of importance of the 
issue to those out-
side of the state only 
make the potential 
outcome in Congress 
even less predictable.
The tri-state water war begins 
As suggested earlier, each of the three states 
has different interests in the waters of the 
ACT and ACF basins. 
At the risk of caricature, and recognizing 
that each state also has private and local 
interests that may differ from the interest of 
the state overall, the positions of the states 
are as follows. 
Alabama relies on the waters in the ACT 
for recreation and the production of hydro-
electricity. 
Florida relies on the waters in the ACF pri-
marily for in situ uses such as recreation (e.g., 
boating and fishing) and for maintaining the 
environment of Apalachicola Bay, which is 
a very productive and fertile marine estuary 
environment and supports one of the largest 
oyster harvests in the country.
As previously stated, Georgia has different 
conflicts within itself over uses in both the 
ACT and the ACF such as municipal water 
supply and agricultural irrigation. 
In addition to the need for Atlanta and 
other burgeoning cities for water, water 
in the Flint River – which meets the 
Chattahoochee River at Lake Seminole to 
form the Apalachicola River – recharges 
groundwater aquifers in South Georgia. 
Unlike some other areas of the country, 
farmers in South Georgia use groundwater 
for irrigation, not surface water. Nevertheless, 
ground water and surface water are inter-
related, and groundwater withdrawals for 
irrigation affect the level of water available in 
the Flint River.
These tensions among the three states orig-
inally came to a head in a lawsuit brought not 
as an original jurisdiction action against one 
of the states against another, but as a lawsuit 
that Alabama brought against the corps. 
The suit alleged the corps had failed 
to comply with NEPA adequately when 
evaluating the environmental impacts of 
a proposed water withdrawal by Georgia, 
and it suggested the corps was exceeding its 
authority by making a de facto allocation of 
the water in the ACT basin. Georgia inter-
vened in the lawsuit to protect its interests in 
the water resources of the ACT.
The interesting fea-
tures of the suit were: 
1) that Alabama had 
brought suit in dis-
trict court (not the 
Supreme Court) over 
a dispute that essen-
tially called upon the 
court to allocate water 
between two states; 
2) that Georgia was 
not originally a party 
to the lawsuit; and 3) 
that a federal statute 
(NEPA) provided 
the basis for the law 
suit, not federal com-
mon law principles 
of interstate resource 
allocation. 
It was this lawsuit, 
eventually stayed, 
that prompted the 
parties to begin the 
negotiations of the 
interstate compacts. 
During the pen-
dency of those negotiations, the parties 
agreed to hold the action in abeyance and 
not to object to reasonable increases in water 
consumption.
A cease-fire in the water war? 
In 1997, the three states agreed to enter 
into two interstate compacts, one for each 
basin (although the relevant terms of the 
compact were identical). 
Unlike many compacts, however, this 
compact had two significant and intertwined 
differences. 
First, the parties agreed only that they 
would reach an agreement about water allo-
cation in the future; the compacts did not 
themselves establish a water allocation or 
water master. 
Second, the parties agreed that discussions 
about water allocation would be subjected to 
public notice, comment and involvement. 
Many such negotiations between states 
in the past have excluded the public from 
involvement in discussions about how to 
allocate natural resources. These three states 
Map courtesy of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service – Georgia Ecological Services Office.
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committed themselves to conduct formal 
sessions in public. 
The governors served as the commission-
ers for the compacts, and the federal govern-
ment also had a nonvoting representative for 
each compact.
Negotiations continued throughout the 
drought that affected the region in the late 
1990s and through 2002. 
One of the key stumbling blocks was the 
insistence of Florida to have a minimum flow 
of water in the Apalachicola at all times. The 
exact level of this flow was one that Georgia 
and Florida could not agree to, especially in 
times of drought.
The presence of negotiations among the 
states did not abate all of the litigation. 
Indeed, in 2000, Georgia brought suit 
against the corps for failing to act on its 
permit application to increase water with-
drawals.3 
Nevertheless, the parties worked hard to 
reach an agreement through the compact 
process, extending it several times from the 
original deadline. 
Alabama and Georgia elected new gov-
ernors who, it was thought, might make 
headway in the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, in 2002, the governor of 
Florida announced that the state would 
withdraw from the negotiation process. 
Because no accord could be reached for 
the ACF basin, negotiations over the ACT 
basin ceased as well and the compacts expired 
under their own terms. 
Litigation that lower courts had, for the 
most part, stayed then reignited.4
Where do we go from here? 
The most interesting question facing the 
three states in this battle is how to resolve it. 
Often, especially with states that adhere 
to the riparian rights doctrine, battles about 
water allocation erupt when there is a 
drought (as opposed to in the West, where 
water shortages are more chronic). 
Fortunately, water supply in the region 
has remained fairly stable during the last 
few years. Unfortunately, however, another 
drought appears to be setting in this summer 
and, as the Atlanta region continues to grow, 
the overall demand for water will continue 
to grow as well.
The states face four choices. 
The first is for one state – most likely 
Florida or Alabama – to bite the bullet and 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court in its origi-
nal jurisdiction to make an allocation of the 
water in these basins. 
The standard for relief, however, is quite 
high, and the law governing how the court 
will make such an allocation is quite unclear. 
Thus, a suit for equitable apportionment 
will not necessarily benefit the petitioning 
state or states. 
Such a suit also may not include some 
of the statutory qualifications on allocat-
ing water required by the panoply of fed-
eral laws affecting it (such as NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act). 
Despite the predictions of some that the 
dispute must make its way to the Supreme 
Court, no state yet has been willing to 
undertake that course of action, and each 
state’s reluctance is understandable.
The second choice is for the states to 
continue to battle each other through small-
er skirmishes in the district and appellate 
courts. These suits have prompted some 
temporary settlements and offer more of a 
chance for taking into account federal legal 
developments. 
On the down side, however, the lower 
courts have thus far been careful to avoid 
making any type of allocation of water and 
thus appearing to interfere with the Supreme 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 
between states. 
These ongoing battles have already raged 
in different courts in different circuits, creat-
ing procedural nightmares from which only 
lawyers will probably benefit.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation has recently consolidated four 
of the lower court cases involving the ACF 
before one judge to make discovery and 
pretrial rulings more efficient. These cases 
were all transferred to the Middle District 
of Florida, an area not directly implicated in 
the ACF battle, and the MDL panel selected 
Judge Paul Magnuson of Minnesota to serve 
as the district court judge in the multidistrict 
cases. Magnuson has experience with diffi-
cult interstate water battles, having served as 
the district court judge with many disputes 
over the allocation and use of the Missouri 
River.
Third, the states could ask Congress to 
make an allocation of the water. The recent 
shift in the composition of the House and 
Senate make this option undesirable for all of 
the concerned states, as the outcome would 
be especially unpredictable.
The best outcome, therefore, would be the 
negotiation of a new interstate compact. 
The affected states should revisit the old 
compacts and review some of the key prob-
lems with them.
One may have been the presence of the 
federal government as a nonvoting commis-
sioner in both. The United States has more 
of an interest in the waters of these basins 
than as a neutral bystander: It operates 
important reservoirs, it has expertise, and 
it is subject to a variety of environmental 
laws regardless of the underlying allocation 
among the states. 
The states should also consider the 
appointment of river masters during the 
pendency of such negotiations. 
Merely agreeing to agree and not harm 
each other creates poor incentives for each 
of the states in terms of conservation and 
proper use.
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